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Chapter 1 
Edu-crafting a Cacophonous Ecology: Posthumanist Research Practices for 
Education  
Carol A. Taylor 
 
Introduction: Posthumanism and educational research    
 
Doing posthumanist research in education is a challenge. At the present time, 
education operates within a largely performative context, in which regimes of 
accountability, desires for a quick and easy relay from theory to practice, and the 
requirement that ‘evidence’ – the most valorized form of which often comes in the 
shape of large-scale Randomized Controlled Trials – ought to inform pedagogic 
interventions, constitute the dominant ways of thinking and modes of inquiry. 
Posthumanist research practices in education engage a radical critique of some of the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning these dominant ways of doing educational 
research.  
 
Posthumanism proposes different starting points for educational research and new 
ways of grasping educational experience than that afforded by humanism. 
Posthumanism calls into question the essentializing binary between human and 
nonhuman on which humanism relies; it throws anthropocentrism into doubt along 
with the categories and identities it underpins. These different starting points are 
located in a different set of epistemological presumptions about the forms of knowing 
that produce valuable knowledge about educational experiences, and in different 
ontological presumptions about the modes of being through which humans and 
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nonhumans inhabit the world. More than that, posthumanist research practices offer a 
new ethics of engagement for education by including the nonhuman in questions 
about who matters and what counts in questioning the constitutive role played by 
humanist dominant paradigms, methodologies and methods in working as actualizers 
of normative procedures. Feminisms and post-strucutualism have also, of course, long 
been interested in the politics of knowledge-production but a posthumanist approach 
includes the ‘others’ that feminism, post-structuralism and postmodernism routinely 
excluded: nonhumans, other-than-humans and more than humans. Posthumanism, 
therefore, offers a ‘theoretical rapprochement with material realism’ (Coole and Frost, 
2010, p.6) to find new ways to engage with the immanent vitality of matter.  
This chapter discusses various arrivals at the posthuman ‘now’; it maps how 
posthumanism undoes humanist assumptions about research methodology and 
methods; and it signals some of the ways in which posthumanism is currently 
reshaping how educational research gets done. While the chapter’s ambit is both 
broad and theoretical in dealing with the recasting of ontology, epistemology and 
ethics under the impress of posthumanism, its purpose, in illuminating how 
posthuman thinking can be put to work in research practices, is practical. Putting 
posthuman theory to work is both exciting and daunting. Posthumanism invites us 
(humans) to undo the current ways of doing – and then imagine, invent and do the 
doing differently. Readers will find many examples throughout this book of the 
innovative forms of doing invoked, indeed necessitated, by posthumanist thinking. 
This first chapter provides an initial sketch of the ground by situating posthumanism 
as both a reaction to humanism (Wolfe, 2010) and an activation of new practices in 
educational research (Snaza and Weaver, 2015). It can, therefore, be read as a) a basic 
mapping of key shifts from humanist to posthumanist modes of knowing, being and 
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doing; and/or b) an introduction to the main contours of posthuman thought; and/or c) 
an introduction to the theories and concepts dealt with in the chapters that follow.    
 
Shiftings: Humanist centerings <> Posthumanist profusion   
 
Posthumanism is a mobile terms and the field of posthumanist thought in education is 
characterized by heterogeneity, multiplicity and profusion. Posthumanism is perhaps 
best considered as a constellation of different theories, approaches, concepts, practices. 
It includes (in no particular order): animal studies; ‘new’ material feminism; affect 
theory; process philosophy; assemblage theory; queer theory; speculative realism; 
thing theory; actor network theory; the nonhuman; the new empiricism; posthuman 
disability studies; object-oriented ontology, alien phenomenology, ecological 
relationality, decolonial and indigenous theories, plus others I don’t know about. 
Posthumanism in its various incarnations is resolutely interdisciplinary, post-
disciplinary, transdisciplinary and anti-disciplinary which vastly expands the range 
and variety of conceptual resources available to educational research. In its current 
state as an unsettled and unsettling terrain – as an emergent field in flux that is 
continually concretising, dispersing, flowing and mutating in unforeseen ways – 
posthumanism opens ways of researching that seek to undo tired binaries such as 
theory/practice, body/mind, body/brain, self/other, emotion/reason, human/nature, 
human/animal, producing instead multiple and heterogeneous knowledge pathways 
that are radically generative for educational research. In doing so it intersects with the 
anti-foundational insights of feminism and post-structuralism concerning the 
multiplicity of identity, the mobility of meaning, and the contestability of knowledge, 
supplementing those earlier insights by including nonhumans, things and materialities. 
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The chapter charts various shiftings which seek to understand the complicated process 
of how we got from ‘there’ (humanism) to ‘here’ (posthumanism). The first shifting 
circumnavigates the im/possible task of describing how we arrived at the posthuman 
now. The subsequent shiftings focus on subjectivity, relationality, and ethics, and 
enfold these with discussions of ontology and epistemology.   
 
Shifting <> Im/possible genealogies 
 
The drawing of any single or straight line from humanism to posthumanism is 
tempting but probably illusory. One possible narrative begins with Foucault’s (1970) 
pronouncement in The Order of Things – ‘man is an invention of recent date. And one 
perhaps nearing its end’ – moves through Derrida and deconstructionism, traverses 
post-structuralism and postmodernism, continues via the many facets of feminism, 
towards Deleuzian rhizomatics, interspecies’ interfaces (Haraway) and Massumi’s 
virtual-real, to arrive (perhaps) at the swirl of Stewart’s affects, Meillassoux’s post 
human world without us, or Downey’s neuroanthropology, or somewhere else instead, 
as long as that somewhere is ‘recognisably’ posthuman. That is, somewhere where the 
‘old’ certitudes regarding identity and subjectivity, binaries and boundaries, language 
and representation, methodology and methods, have been utterly displaced. The 
problem, though, in tracing this narrative line is that it has no one starting place and 
certainly no end in sight. We are already in the middle of the posthuman condition, its 
forces already entangled in the humanist fibre of our lives and thinking. Being 
intermezzo like this troubles the concepts of ‘ends’ and ‘beginnings’ and undermines 
the notion of lineage.  
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On the other hand, we could, as Snaza (2015, p.19) admirably attempts to do, 
conceptualise a genealogy of ‘the human’ through its relation to various ‘constitutive 
outsides: the animal, the machine, the savage, the slave, nature, the thing.’ These 
conceptualisations arise from and are (still) tied to particular historically educative 
processes and located in particular educational institutional practices. Thus, we move 
from humanism’s putative ‘origins’ in Plato’s ‘carnophallogocentric’ (Derrida’s 
phrase) humanism which constitutes the meat-eating, male, rational political citizen 
and subject as different from and innately superior to woman, the emotional, and 
animal, to its incarnation in the Medieval Trivium and Quadrivium, a liberal arts 
education which was a basis for the production of the educated ‘man’, through 
Renaissance Humanism with its focus on the development of man’s artistic, literary 
and moral capabilities. The Western Enlightenment built on these earlier conceptions 
but, via colonialism and science, generated a version of humanism grounded in the 
separation of, and domination by, a small-ish section of ‘mankind’ from/of the ‘rest of’ 
nature, humanity, and nonhuman ‘others’ in accordance with it’s god-given civilizing 
mission. Postmodern, post-structuralist and feminist theorists worked, rightly, to 
destablise the origin myths of humanism and reincorporate those inappropriate/d 
others. Much of this theorising (although Haraway’s critique of speciesism is an 
exception), did not sufficiently unsettle the primacy of the ‘human’ as a central 
category of political privilege, thus leaving the systematic oppressions and ontological 
erasures that earlier forms of humanism had instituted largely intact. It is this 
unsettling that posthumanism seeks to accomplish for good. The aim is, as Snaza 
(2015, p.27) notes, to undo the telos of humanism and its ‘humanizing project’ so that 
posthumanist thought can engage ‘a future politics not reducible to anthropocentric 
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institutions and practices’. In essence, this involves replacing the idea that the human 
is a separate category from ‘everything else’ with an ethic of mutual relation.   
 
Furthermore, like posthumanism, humanism is and always has been heterogeneous. 
As Braidotti (2013, pp.50-51) notes ‘there are in fact many humanisms.’ There are 
romantic, revolutionary, liberal, secularist, antihumanist humanisms (Davies, 1997); 
there are intellectualist, spiritualist and metaphysical humanisms (Derrida, 1972); and 
there are Renaissance, academic, catholic or integral, subjective, naturalistic and 
religious humanisms (Lamont, 1997), as well as various versions of critical humanism 
(Plummer, 2012). The philosophical foundations of humanism are varied, and some 
humanisms do away with universalizations and recognize the material, concrete, 
pragmatic and partial basis of human experience. That humanism, like posthumanism, 
never was (or is) singular is, according to Braidotti, part of the problem: as soon as we 
express the desire to ‘overcome humanism’, we very quickly realize how utterly 
entwined we are within humanism’s affordances and problematics, as feminisms and 
poststructuralists already know. Any dis-entangling, therefore, has to be a continuing 
and incisive critical practice, not one done easily or ‘once and for all’. Yet the desire 
to ‘overcome’ humanism is urgent and necessary. One only has to think for a moment 
of the geopolitical suffering, ecological depredation, and epistemological violence 
that humanism, particularly in its alliance with neo-colonialism and hyper-capitalism, 
has given rise to, to appreciate the urgency of the task. Thinking for a moment longer, 
though, might bring to mind humanism’s legacy of universal Human Rights, 
communitarian politics and disability equality legislation. These are things we 
humans would probably not want to do away with albeit that they often work as 
positive guises beneath which humanism seeks to hide its wreckages. One can 
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appreciate that the larger project of becoming posthuman is fraught with difficulty, 
just as inventing practices which use posthumanist frames of reference in educational 
research are contentious.  
  
Shifting <> Subjectivity 
 
‘Trippers and askers surround me,  
People I meet … the effect upon me of my early life … of the ward and city I live in 
… of the nation, […] But they are not the Me myself.  
Apart from the pulling and hauling stands what I am, 
Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary, 
Looks down, is erect,  […]  
Both in and out of the game, and watching and wondering at it’.   
 (Whitman, 1855, extract from Song of Myself, l. 58–70). 
 
‘Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987, p.3).  
 
‘I stood at the entrance … I also stood some forty meters away, in the temple itself … 
Outside the doors of the temple I also stood in the cyanophyte-stained plaza … I 
patrolled [the upper city] as well. When I walked the edge of the water I could see 
myself standing in the plaza … That accounted for almost half of my twenty bodies. 
The remainder slept or worked in the house Lieutenant Awn occupied.’ (Ann Leckie, 
2013, Ancillary Justice, pp.12–15).  
 
In 1855 Whitman wrote confidently of the ‘Me myself’ as a secure place of 
observation and knowledge, founded in the essentialising masculine ego of the 
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Western Enlightenment modernist self. Song of Myself is an undoubtedly exuberant 
epic but one which exemplifies Descartes cogito, the knowing subject who stands 
apart from the world to observe, describe, measure and know it. This knowing figure 
keeps his distance from the world and aims to keep himself, his ‘essence’, intact. He 
sometimes paradoxically desires to consume/subsume ‘it’ (the world, woman, all 
those ‘others’) into ‘his’ identity, but doing so would dissolve the foundations of t/his 
separate knowing, thinking, feeling, and seeing self, and with it the ontological and 
epistemological presumptions on which it is founded. This separation of self/world, 
the division of self/other it inaugurates, is his triumph, his tragedy, and, through 
postcolonial, feminist, post-structuralist, or posthumanist eyes, a principal cause of his 
demise. Such a self-centre cannot hold as many postcolonial, feminist and 
poststructural critics have shown, and as many indigenous peoples have perhaps 
always known. The Enlightenment ego cannot function (or, in some mode, can only 
function) through repression, violence and subjection.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1997: p.3–4) play with the Enlightenment ‘I’, throw its basis 
for producing truth, facts, knowledge, into doubt, pluralize it, and multiply it. They do 
so, they say, ‘not to reach the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it 
is no longer of any importance whether one says I.’ The I they posit is immanent to 
the social field, world and nature. This I is an intensity, an affective meld, a 
convergence of forces, always unstable, mobile, emerging, becoming. There is no 
cogito to centre and stabilise this I as it gets plugged into temporary assemblages, 
themselves composed through heterogeneity and multiplicity. This I does not 
reproduce itself by constituting binaries, divisions, hierarchies or any distinctions that 
separate out human/other. This I is, instead, detachable, reversible, open and 
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connectable. It makes maps not tracings of the terrain, that is, it does not seek to copy 
and reproduce what is already there but works via creative ‘experimentation in 
contact with the real’ (ibid, p.13). The knowledge this I produces does not require 
succour from a system of logical, objective rationalism with its linear and root-based 
presumptions that the ‘right’ research methodology and methods will disclose the 
‘truth’ of the subject under inquiry. Instead, it unpicks the Enlightenment package of 
teleology, progress and development, operating instead with an idea of knowledge as 
a machinic network for knowing, replacing arborescent, lineage and root-based 
images of thought with rhizomic modes of knowing characterised by non-linearity, 
multiplicity, connectivity, dimensions (rather than a pivot), flatness (rather than 
depth), and ruptures which may (or may not) tie unforeseen things together so that 
they work. The rhizome as a-centred image of thought shifts the focus from 
knowledge ‘about’, procedures for producing knowledge, and concerns about what 
knowing ‘is’ to questions about what knowledge does, how it works, and how its 
effectivity may generate more (not less) of life.  
 
The voice of the third extract belongs to One Esk Eleven, AI ancillary and former 
human, who inhabits multiple bodies, and is also materially manifest as the troop 
carrier ship, Justice of Toren who/which has a taste for antique choral and folk songs. 
Over two thousand years old, Justice of Toren has more than five senses, vast 
memory powers, and a tact, courtesy and sensitivity which make her communicative 
powers exemplary. One Esk is called ‘she’ for convenience because the Radchaai, the 
‘race’ that colonised her, don’t recognise gender difference. She is a complicated 
more-than-human entity with a conscience, a consciousness and multiple identities. 
She is the cyborg we (humans) all already are, as Haraway (1991, pp.150–151) 
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reminded us a while ago: we are ‘theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and 
organism which operate with ‘partiality, intimacy, irony and perversity’ to undo any 
origin stories that institute difference. Cyborgs, as oppositional and utopian entities, 
signal the breakdown of the three boundaries which have held in place our ‘last 
beachheads of [human] uniqueness’: human/animal; animal-human organism/ 
machine; physical/ non-physical. The posthuman possible the cyborg heralds and 
institutes works through alliance, coalition, relationality.  
 
And yet. The dispersals, possibilities and polymorphous becomings offered by 
posthuman identities are not equally available to all. For some the same old same old 
striations operate along class, gender, ‘race’, able/bodied, sexualised lines. Consider 
the UK House of Commons vote (3
rd
 February 2015) to amend the 2008 Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act to enable mitochondrial transfer allowing ‘three-
person-embryos’ to be artificially produced. Medically justified by its supporters on 
the grounds that it will help eliminate one strain of mitochondrial disease – a cause of 
liver failure and brain damage at embryo stage – the amendment enables the 
development of new IVF treatments in which the nucleus from the genetic mother’s 
egg is transferred into a donor’s egg either before or after the donor egg is fertilized 
with sperm. While the case for the alleviating of human suffering is (perhaps) worth 
considering, the most striking concern is the commodification, invasion, appropriation 
of women’s bodies as the primary genetic matter for this technological 
experimentation (mitochondria are passed on genetically by women not men) and 
their genetic exploitation under the ruthlessly competitive conditions released by the 
flows of global capital, illuminating how ‘market forces [now] happily trade on Life 
itself’ (Braidotti, 2013, p.59). Also consider the recent film Ex Machina which 
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features a contemporary-posthuman future ruthlessly gendered along binary lines in 
which (perennial) masculine fantasies of sexual compliance and desire for a beguiling 
female robot possessing youth and beauty, play out alongside fears of the return of the 
monstrous feminine, the true possessor of the phallus, the castrating ‘other’ to the 
vulnerable male human. In the posthuman now-and-to-come, whose future matters 
more? And if, as Braidotti (2013, pp.80 - 81) hopes, posthuman feminism provides a 
rebel stance against ‘the political economy of phallogocentrism and of 
anthropocentric humanism’, then how might this work in education?  
 
For many, the posthuman promise of human dis-placement brings with it profound 
anxieties in contemporary conditions of rapid social, cultural, economic and 
technological change. Braidotti (2013, p.9) comments on how unmanned drones have 
brought a form of ‘necro-politics’ to posthuman global armed warfare which 
profoundly transform the practice of war by distancing human decision-making from 
the act of killing. Shiny, clean, easy death by machine: we (humans) have no part in it 
and, therefore, no messy guilt or shame to deal with. And if our collective 
conscience/individual consciousness is momentarily troubled by the thought that ‘real’ 
people, animals, plants, things and buildings are destroyed, we can always comfort 
ourselves with the fact that the ‘war on terror’ is a necessary thing carried out on our 
behalf to safeguard democracy from those not quite as politically-morally-civically-
educationally ‘advanced’ as ‘us’ i.e. those ‘others’ who don’t share ‘our’ commitment 
to human life and the attendant civilized Enlightenment values that follow. If ‘death 
by drone’ illuminates how ethics are being recast under posthuman conditions, it also 
sharply highlights how (particular versions of) humanism are entwined with 
posthumanism.   
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 Shifting <> Relationality 
 
‘Nature has been given a baton and she is conducting musical interpretations 
of the forest's creatures and plant life as they interact with each other, resulting 
in a “live” and “ever-changing” performance in response to the atmosphere’ 
(Barber, 2014).  
 
‘The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins 
there’ (Derrida, 2002, p.397). 
 
‘The 90-minute performance [of Cloakroom] sees [Tilda] Swinton taking 
clothes that have been checked in by audience members on arrival, and 
treating them as her co-stars. She nuzzled a red mohair coat, buried her face in 
a suit jacket and had a conversation with a gilet’ (Singh, 2015).  
 
New material feminism, eco-philosophy, and object-oriented ontology and other 
posthuman approaches emphasise an ecology of human-nonhuman relations in which 
we (all) are embedded and entangled. They undo easy/old notions of the ‘we’ in order 
to move beyond the speciesism and anthropocentrism of humanism (Wolfe, 2010) 
towards modes of interbeing, interspeciesbeing and worlding. Manning (cited in 
Springgay, 2015, p.76) refers to ‘ecologies of encounter’ which unfix agency with its 
humanist ontological grounding in individuality and instead recognise a plurality of 
interrelationality. The posthuman promise of ecologies of encounter has been 
articulated in a variety of ways. For example, Braidotti’s (2013, p.100) affirmative 
posthuman feminism leads her to propose a materialist, vitalist, embodied and 
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embedded politics of/for Life itself which gives priority to the ‘irrepressible flows of 
encounters, interactions, affectivity and desire.’ Bennett’s (2010, p.6) concern is with 
the vitality of things and she praises ‘the curious ability of inanimate things to 
animate, to act, to produce effects both dramatic and subtle.’ For Bennett, thing-
power reconceptualises ontology as a distributed swarm and agency as 
‘congregational’ and ‘confederate.’ Haraway (2008, p.182) talks of her ‘encounters in 
dogland, with people and dogs, that have reshaped my heart, mind, and writing.’ She 
avows her love and desire for Cayenne, her dog, which motivates her ‘to be good for 
and with her. Really good.’ Forget distance, be-with the dog on the floor, in the grass, 
because these ‘meetings make us who and what we are in the avid contact zones that 
are the world’ (Haraway, 2008, p.287).  
 
Inspired by quantum physics, Barad’s (2007) agential realism is a posthuman 
performative account of the onto-epistemological beings, becomings and knowings 
made possible when these differing modes and understandings of relationality are set 
in motion. Agential realism proposes that intentions are not the interior possessions of 
individuals but cohere and are expressed in human-nonhuman networks, that 
subjectivity is not the property and possession of a separately bodied individual but 
that all that exists comes to being through intra-active material processes of 
emergence (not as pre-existent separate entities), and that causality as a linear and 
traceable series of effects between isolated objects has to be rethought as a material 
practice in which who/whatever makes an agential cut – and in a classroom that doing 
could be done by a coat, a chair, a pen, an ipad, a computer screen, the atmosphere, 
the temperature, just as much as any human – generates ongoing and continually 
differentiating interconnections that constitute the mattering of the world. Causality, 
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hence, ‘is an entangled affair … of cutting things together and apart within and as part 
of phenomena’ (Barad, 2007, p.394). Proceeding from our material entanglement 
agential realism, as a posthuman practice of mattering, profoundly reworks ontology, 
epistemology and ethics.  
 
Posthuman forms of hybrid human-natural-object-animal intermixing instantiate 
Derrida’s (2002, p.381) hoped-for ‘multiple and heterogeneous border’ which does 
away with ‘the abyssal limit of the human’. Looking at his cat looking back at him, 
Derrida felt that ‘everything can happen to me, I am like a child ready for the 
apocalypse’. In valuing the inhuman and ahuman, the posthuman opens an onto-
epistemological opportunity space for that ‘everything’ to happen but that doesn’t 
mean we (humans) can content ourselves with the luxury of being wide-eyed/ wild-
eyed innocents. We (humans) are responsible for producing ‘the human’ as a separate 
political, ontological and epistemological category in the first place so, some 
posthumanists of the dark ecology movement (Morton, 2009) might argue, if there is 
a coming apocalypse perhaps it is both deserved and ought to be invited. 
Presumptions that the world is as it is for us are nothing other than an idealized myth 
of anthropocentric dominion. In this vein, Wallin (2015, p.135) agues, that the world 
we have made and now know is a world of contamination and decay; the earth is not 
the pristine blue planet but a planet gripped by geotrauma. This post human ‘alter 
Eaarth’ (ibid, p.139) is utterly indifferent to human life, human action is futile, and 
humans have to learn to deal with ‘the superabundant material realities unthinkable by 
humans’ (ibid, p.140). Such narratives of human obsolescence provoke varying 
responses, from a recuperated cosmopolitan humanism grounded in our shared 
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humanity (Skillington, 2015) to the mobilization of pessimism ‘as an ethical force’ 
(Wallin, 2015, p.134) in thinking a posthuman world without privilege.      
 
Shifting <> Ethics 
 
Encounters, meetings, contacts. Responsibility, accountability, commitment. These 
are some of the key terms through which posthuman ethics are currently figured and 
which offer some ways out of the ethical cul-de-sac of humanism – with its 
phenomenal grounding of moral conceptions in the anthropos of individual bodies and 
its abstract and universalising rights-based discourses – in which we have been rather 
too complacently and comfortably sequestered for too long (despite the fact that all 
along only some individuals and some peoples’ rights count for anything at all). 
Thinking posthuman ethics, therefore, begins by re-thinking interdependence, by 
including nonhumans in an ethics of care, by understanding the human always and 
only in-relation-to nonhumans who are no longer ‘others’ but are, intimately and 
always, ourselves as the body multiple. Embodying and enacting ethics-in-relation is 
anxiety provoking to the extent that it dispenses with the privileged position of human 
separability and the fantasy of distance it installs. So Barad (2007, p.394) writes: 
‘Responsibility entails an ongoing responsiveness to the entanglements of self and 
other, here and there, now and then’ in an emergent process that is, at one and the 
same time, the ongoing material co-constitution of the world and an instantiation of 
practices of mattering (i.e. agential cuts which mean that some bodies count for more 
than others). Posthuman ethics, from a ‘new’ material feminist perspective, is an ethic 
of ‘worlding’ and proceeds from the presumption that ethics is not about trying to see 
the world from inside someone else’s shoes – which presumes individuated bodies. 
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Rather, it means recognising skin not as a barrier-boundary but as a porous, 
permeable sensorium of connectivity with/in a universe of dynamic co-constitutive 
and differential becomings.  
 
MacCormack (2012), too, is interested in developing ethics as an incarnate relation. 
Whereas Barad looks to quantum entanglements, MacCormack tracks back beyond 
the Cartesian bifurcation of body and mind to Spinoza’s conception of the 
corporeality of the mind. For Spinoza, there is ‘no body without mind, no 
individuality without connection, no connection without another dividuated life with 
its own concomitant reality, no affect without expression, will as appetite beyond 
consciousness and, perhaps most importantly, no thought or theory without 
materiality’ (MacCormack, 2012, p.4). A posthuman ethics, therefore, must be 
situational, emergent and unique, located in capacity and action, play out in living 
bodies as the point of ethical address, and be orientated to practices that are a positive 
affirmation of life. Because in Spinozist ethics ‘the gift of liberty is allowing the 
power of the other to expand toward unknown futures’ (ibid, p.1) ethics becomes a 
material practice of passion, difference and expansion.  
 
Spinozan ethics are activated in Bennett’s (2010) posthuman conceptualisation of 
thing-power. Derived from Spinoza’s account of conatus (a substance which is itself 
in its continuing and creative self-differentiation), conative bodies are associative, 
social and affective; they form alliances and enter into assemblages with all manner of 
other bodies, forming ad hoc grouping of vital materialities. For Bennett (201, p.23), 
these ‘living, throbbing confederations’ with their horizontal and heterogeneous 
ontological capacities and the distributed agentic dance they engage in, are the site for 
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posthuman ethics. As Bennett (2010, p.37) suggests: ‘the ethical responsibility of an 
individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one 
finds oneself participating.’ Such flattened ontologies and epistemologies of knowing-
in-being not only recalibrate modes of responsibility and accountability, they also 
‘chasten our will to mastery’ (Bennett, 2010, p.15). Similar points are made by 
Braidotti (2013, p.129) for whom our shared vulnerability provides the condition for 
an ‘affirmative ethics based on the praxis of constructing positivity’ which will enable 
new social conditions and productive relations to be forged ‘out of injury and pain’ 
(ibid, p.130).    
 
Braidotti says we need to be worthy of the present and time and again the word 
‘humble’ and ‘humility’ appears as a desired goal in considerations of posthuman 
ethics. Perhaps the desire for a posthuman ethics which displaces the morality of man 
with interspecies relationality may be best and cautiously ‘propelled by the tasty but 
risky obligation of curiosity among companion species, once we know, we cannot not 
know. If we know well, searching with fingery eyes, we care. That is how 
responsibility grows’ (Haraway, 2008, p.287). While this ethical project must be ‘a 
permanent critique of ourselves’ (Wolfe, 2010, p.xvi), the obligations it gives rise to 
will not be known in advance because each and every encounter keeps the matter of 
ethics open.  
  
Unmoorings <> Method/ology undone 
 
What happens to method/ology in the posthuman if, as Rotas (2015, p.102) suggests 
‘human beings are not the only “participants” within a research study?’ The question 
 24 
is a profound one which destabilises many, if not all, of the ways knowledge has been 
produced about education during the last few centuries. Snaza and Weaver (2015) 
point out that posthumanism hasn’t yet had much impact on educational studies but 
even a cursory glace at the mundane aspects of everyday lives within educational 
contexts indicates the necessity of taking the nonhuman into account alongside and 
with the human. Think, for example, of the chains of techno-chemical processing 
which have already transformed the ‘food’ in children’s school dinners before it 
enters their mouths; or the millions of other-than-human microbes, bacteria and 
parasites that circulate amongst school populations each day as young people touch 
computer keyboards, share ipads or books, and sit or play together; or the pervasive 
use of social media within schools, the peer cultures that require belonging through 
particular items of clothing and objects; as well as the ways in which schooling 
practices are integrated with technological apparatuses such as interactive 
whiteboards; and the surveillance regimes that deploy nonhuman actors including 
computerized registers, webcam security systems, and classroom video observatories. 
These examples are from schools but conceptualizing the co-production of further and 
higher education by posthuman-human agencies is also a necessary and urgent task.     
 
Mapping the posthuman within educational research is a complicated and lively 
endeavour, given our location after method (Law, 2004) and already in post-
qualitative research which seeks to dispense with all the presumptions and categories 
of humanist qualitative research (Lather and St. Pierre, 2013). Yet, as Brinkman 
(2015, p.621) has recently indicated, ‘good old-fashioned qualitative inquiry’ 
(GOFQI) with its centerings in dialogue, voice, empathy, narrative, meaning, method, 
coding, data (and I would add, rigour, trustworthiness and validity) ‘lives by constant 
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self-destruction and resurrection like a phoenix.’ Which means that the presumptions 
it entails – that one can access, know about, and represent the ‘experience’ of an 
‘other’s’ ‘reality’ – are not so easily dispensed with, no matter how reflexively one 
tries, as various feminisms and ‘posts-’ have already shown. And which is why Lather 
(2013, p.635) points out that ‘there is no methodological instrumentality to be 
unproblematically learned’, what we have instead is ‘methodology-to-come’ which 
means that we ‘begin to do it differently’ with every new project and ‘wherever we 
are in our projects.’  
 
Being methodologically in the mess (Law, 2004), in the middle (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1997), and in the mesh (Ingold, 2007), makes the question many doctoral students 
(including myself) were invited to struggle with – ‘do I choose a paradigm first within 
which to shape the research, or does the research question dictate paradigm choice’ – 
now seems rather beside the point – because beginning in the here of posthuman 
research dis-places the whole panoply of what arrives with one’s ‘choice’ of research 
paradigm. As Barad (2007) illuminates, practices, doings and actions are enactments 
of presumptions about ontology, epistemology and ethics. Taking this up in 
posthumanist research practices means we begin with immanence, relation, non-
separability, values, partisanship, responsibility for each and every choice or cut, 
immersion, emergence. Beginning with the embodied idea that posthumanist research 
is an ethico-onto-epistemological practice of materially-emergent co-constitution 
what emerges as ‘research’ cannot be ‘about’ something or somebody, nor can it be 
an individualised cognitive act of knowledge production. Rather, posthumanist 
research is an enactment of knowing-in-being that emerges in the event of doing 
research itself. In opening new means to integrate thinking and doing, it offers an 
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invitation to come as you are and to experiment, invent and create both with what is 
(already) at hand and by bringing that which might (or might not be) useful because 
you don’t yet know into the orbit of research.    
 
Posthuman scholars such as Maclure, Lather, St Pierre, Koro-Ljunberg and Mazzei 
and Jackson, amongst others, encourage researchers to track down the very many 
ways the human is enfolded within and intercedes in the research process, 
encouraging vigilance to the unwitting ways that humanist remnants smuggle 
themselves into posthuman research intraventions. You can’t simply mix and stir 
posthumanism into a research design. Neither it is enough to ‘adapt’ a familiar 
method to posthumanist ends, as Kuntz and Presnall’s (2012) reconceputalisation of 
the interview as intra-view shows. Nor will it do to ‘add’ a posthuman analysis to the 
interpretation of data that has been conventionally collected, instead new analytic 
practices such as attending to moments of ‘productive disconcertion’ and the rebel 
becomings induced by data ‘hotspots’ are needed (MacLure, 2013). So, if the ‘usual’ 
methodological procedures are no longer possible in the posthuman, if we invite 
emergence and take the question ‘can posthumanist research be ‘planned’ in advance’ 
seriously, then how to proceed?  
 
Many of those putting posthumanist research practices to work take up Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) invocation regarding ‘the logic of the AND’, developing rhizomic 
means to interrogate educational instances in their manifold multiplicity. Others take 
up Barad’s (2007) agential realism, using the concepts of intra-action, entanglement, 
cut, apparatus, and phenomena to drive their research intra-ventions. Others, like 
Bennett (2010, p.xiii), propose following ‘the scent’ of the thing, where to follow 
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means ‘always to be in response to call from something, however nonhuman it may 
be.’ For Bennett, following entails lingering in moments so as to avail oneself of the 
fascination of objects, of letting sense wander so that it may become attuned to things 
and their affects. Harman (2011), following Latour, offers the love of lists by which to 
adumbrate the beauty of the real that surrounds us which, he avers, cannot be known 
but can only be loved. Bogost (2012), also in speculative realist vein, prefers 
speculative fictions as a means to imaginatively capture alien phenomenology, that is 
the trails left by things as they withdraw to pursue their thingly lives without us. 
Stewart (2007, p.1) practices speculation and curiosity to provoke attention to the 
forces, resonances and impacts of moments, events and sensations of the ‘weighted 
and reeling present’ she seeks to approach.   
 
These practices dis-place ‘methodol/ogy’ and call forth new ways of finding out. 
Springgay (2015) suggests that these new ways of doing may be better approached as 
‘techniques’ than methods or research tools in that techniques are processual, 
emergent and continually reinvent themselves. As a way of leaning into a posthuman 
practice that is ‘a mode of thought, already in the act’ (Manning and Massumi, 2014, 
p.ix), techniques activate modalities of thought, rhythmns, affects from inside the act, 
techniques activate a practice from within, thinkings-in-the act set practice in motion, 
so that practice becomes interference, always diffractive, multiple, uneasy and intense. 
And it is perhaps because of the profound questions posthumanism raises about what 
research is and how it may get done differently that posthumanist researchers lean 
towards arts-based, visual, sensory, movement, sonic and creative writing practices 
(as in some of the chapters in this volume). Such post-disciplinary conversations give 
rise to questions about what data are, how they matter, and how we may interpret the 
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empirical materials (Denzin’s phrase for those entities formerly known as ‘data’) 
generated in any act of research. These questions work as a practical means to push 
forward the open question about what constitutes educational research in the 
posthuman.  
 
Edu-crafting <> The potentia of posthuman research practices in education  
 
Immanent, vitalist, materialist, embedded, embodied, relational, sensory, affective, 
contingent, experimental. These are the modes of thinking-in-being which issue a call 
to those interested in posthumanist research practices in education. Such research 
cannot be ‘done’ or ‘carried out’, it may only be activated, enacted, instantiated, so 
that it strives to set in motion a ‘cacophonous ecology’ (Manning and Massumi, 2014, 
p.viii) of bodies, objects, materialities, affects, sensations, movements, forces. 
Posthuman research enactments are a practice of the plunge: letting go, diving, 
freefall, surfing, swimming, waving and drowning. They are a plunging into 
particularity that collapses scale, structure and level – to (try to) see a world in a grain 
of sand, indeed – and a committed ethico-onto-epistemological venture to (try to) do 
away with the binaries that have held ‘man’ and ‘human’ so securely in place as a 
means to other everything/everyone else. Plunging is a messy, ungainly and 
sometimes dangerous business: there are no methodological safeholds, handholds or 
niches for secure knowing. Yet one of the forces that traverse and propel us in the not-
known of posthumanist research in education is potentia: energy, vitality, the 
constitutive desire to endure. Potentia, Braidotti (2013, p.137) says, ‘disintegrates the 
ego with its capital of narcissism, paranoia and negativity’ and installs an affirmative 
power; it provokes experiments with posthuman modes of subjectivity; and it 
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generates relational posthuman encounters productive of new forms of sociality. 
Potentia may also help activate modes of radical experimentation to propel 
posthuman research practices that the field of education can benefit from.  
Edu-craft is a neologism I’ve made up to think about how to join the impulse behind 
craftivism (a movement which uses craft for critical thinking, questioning and 
considered creative activism) with ‘new’ material feminist/ posthuman research 
practices. Edu-crafting, as a posthuman research experiment, puts bodies, things and 
concepts in motion. One example of an edu-craft intervention I’ve enacted with 
undergraduate students entails a collaborative investigation of how the curriculum is 
brought into being and enacted though a mutable range of posthuman materialites and 
spatialities.  Activities include focusing on the nonhuman matter that textures the 
seminar room space, tuning into embodied enactments of space in classrooms, and 
experimenting with noise, atmosphere and light. The challenging of working out how 
to describe these activities, account for their effects, and explain the passages of affect 
they make possible draws us further into the human-nonhuman conjunctions within 
the ‘fielding of the event’ (Manning and Massumi, 2014, p.14). From this, assessment 
becomes a practice of making some ‘stuff’ (a mood board, photos, poems, objects) as 
a spatio-material record of our immersion in educational spaces; of connecting these 
to a post-disciplinary analysis of the space and matter of educational experience 
which draws resources from a range of disciplines (sociology, education, organisation 
studies, material culture studies); and of producing a collaborative journal to collect 
our texts and products. These emergent workings out of the affective, material and 
spatial happenings as curriculum practices interrogate inherited educational categories 
and knowledge boundaries, helping to foreground agency as a posthuman ‘commotion 
of co-activity’ (ibid, p.14).  This edu-craft intervention, as a matter of knowing-in-
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doing, draws theoretically, on Barad’s (2007, p.170) view that ‘bodies do not simply 
take their place in the world ... rather “environments” and “bodies” are intra- actively 
constituted.’ It also summons Debord’s (1955) notions of the dérive (getting lost) and 
the détournement (re-routing or hijacking) by undoing the ‘tight’ modular package 
within which undergraduates’ usual modes of knowing, learning and writing are 
normally contained. These edu-crafting activities sometimes produce profound 
discomfort and sometimes generate desires for greater risks. This particular example 
of edu-crafting sits uneasily on the boundaries between educational research, 
pedagogic practice and reflective practice; it blurs individuality by trying to think self 
in motion in spatio-material assemblages; it destabilises student assessment by 
provoking the production of things and objects not just written assignments; and it 
invites consideration of the confederate activity of all manner of bodies, not just 
human bodies, in the production of the curriculum. It is just one instance of how an 
experimental research/pedagogy/practice can open a way to think the unforeseen, 
temporary, unpredictable and contingent, and draw attention to the regimes of 
normalcy and oppressive institutional sedimentations that higher education spaces 
often entail and require us to embody.  
 
Concluding <> continuing 
 
Posthumanism is a mobile term, a concept in motion, an active theoretical assemblage. 
As an itinerant constellation of differing intellectual vectors and scholarly 
convocations, it gives rise to a complex mix of anxieties and fears as well as 
pleasurable fantasies, hopes and dreams about the newly possible in educational 
research.  
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This chapter has introduced posthumanism as a theoretical field, explored some of its 
conceptual moorings, and considered how empirical research in education is recast 
when the implications of posthumanism are taken as a starting point. It has proposed 
that there is no one line from humanism to posthumanism but, rather, various 
complicated genealogies. What is not in question is that the exclusions, hierarchies 
and violences imposed by Eurocentric, colonialist, and patriarchal forms of humanism 
have been instrumental in provoking new modes of posthuman thinking and doing to 
contest these denigrations.  
 
Far from being a future event, posthumanist practices and ways of thinking and doing 
are already with us. Posthumanism is entangled with the philosophical and everyday 
frames of reference through which ethical judgements are filtered and reconstituted; it 
informs the cultural categories, biological framings and technological procedures by 
which we make ourselves up as individual humans and as humans in relation to our 
human and other-than-human earthy cohabitants; and it is imbricated in the hyper-
capitalist neo-liberal economic imperatives that have gained precedence in 
constituting and explaining who ‘we’ are at this moment in the world’s history. The 
‘everydayness’ of posthumanism supports Braidotti’s (2013, p.2) point that the 
posthuman condition has introduced a ‘qualitative shift in our thinking about what 
exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our 
relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet.’ 
 
The challenge for posthumanist educational research is how to produce knowledge 
about education which undoes the humanist presumptions that have thus far grounded 
educational research. The approaches and practices outlined in this chapter try in 
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various ways to do away with method/ology-as-usual by opening a wider purview for 
transdisciplinarity, and by activating potentia, with its promise of more ecological 
modes of being, based on relationality and co-constitutive worlding. The innovative 
posthuman practices touched on here generate concerns which resonate throughout 
the book. I have included brief mention of edu-crafting as an experimental approach I 
have developed in my own field of higher education to illuminate my own (here, now, 
emerging, provisional) response to the posthumanist challenge to (try to) do 
educational research and pedagogy differently.   
 
References 
 
Barad, K. (2007) Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. London: Duke University Press.  
 
Barber, M. (2014) ‘Thetford Forest wildlife “performs” Living Symphonies' premier’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-27256881, accessed 22 August 2014.  
 
Bennett, J. (2010) Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. London: Duke 
University Press.  
 
Bogost, I. (2012) Alien Phenomenology, Or What It’s Like to Be a Thing. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Braidotti, R. (2013) The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity.  
 
 33 
Coole, D., and S. Frost. (2010) New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, Politics. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Davies, T. (1997) Humanism. London: Routledge.  
Debord G, 1955 ‘Introduction to a critique of urban geography’ Les Levres Nues, 6 
http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/display/2. Accessed 12 December 
2013 
Deleuze G. and Guattari F. (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. London: Continuum.  
Derrida, J. (1972) Margins of Philosophy. Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Derrida, J. (2002) ‘The animal that therefore I am (more to follow)’, Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 28, No. 2. pp. 369-418.  
 
Foucault, F. (1970) The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
New York: Vintage/Random House.  
 
Haraway, D. (1991) Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. 
London: Free Association Books.  
 
Haraway, D. (2008). When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Harman, G. (2011) The Quadruple Object. Alresford, Hants: Zero Books.  
 
 34 
Ingold, T. (2007) Lines: A Brief History. Abingdon: Routledge.  
 
Kuntz , A. and Presnall, M. (2012) ‘Wandering the tactical: From interview to 
intraview’, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 18, Issue 9, p. 732-744.  
 
Lamont, C. (1997) The Philosophy of Humanism. Amherst, NY, Humanist Press.  
 
Lather, P. (2013) ‘Methodology-21: what do we do in the afterward?’, International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, Vol. 26, No., pp. 634-645  
 
Lather, P. and St. Pierre, E. (2013) ‘Post-qualitative Research’, International Journal 
of Qualitative Studies in Education, Vol. 26, Issue 6, p. 629-633.   
 
Law, J. (2004) After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. Oxon: Routledge.   
 
Leckie, A. (2013) Ancillary Justice. London: Orbit.  
 
MacCormack, P. (2012) Posthuman Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory. 
Surrey: Ashgate.  
 
MacLure, M. (2013) ‘Classification or wonder? Coding as an analytic practice in 
qualitative research’, in R. Coleman and J. Ringrose (Eds.) Deleuze and 
Research Methodologies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
 35 
Manning, E. and Massumi, B. (2014) Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of 
Experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Morton, T. (2009) Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
 
Plummer, K. (2012) ‘A Manifesto for critical humanism in sociology’, 
http://kenplummer.com/manifestos/a-manifesto-for-a-critical-humanism-in-
sociology/  
Accessed 17 July 2015.  
 
Rotas, N. (2015) ‘Ecologies of praxis: Teaching and learning against the obvious’, in  
N. Snaza and J. Weaver (Eds.) Posthumanism and Educational Research. 
London: Routledge, pp. 91-103.  
 
Singh, A. (2015) ‘Tilda Swinton's latest performance art: licking coats’, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/11350653/Tilda-Swintons-
latest-performance-art-licking-coats.html, accessed 16 January 2015.  
 
Skillington, T. (2015) ‘Theorizing the anthropocene’, European Journal of Social 
Theory, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 229–235.   
 
Snaza, N. (2015) ‘Toward a genealogy of educational humanism’, in N. Snaza and J. 
Weaver (Eds.) Posthumanism and Educational Research. London: Routledge, 
pp. 17-29.  
 36 
 
Snaza, N. and Weaver, J. (Eds.) (2015) Posthumanism and Educational Research. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Springgay, S. (2015) ‘Approximate rigorous abstractions: Propositions of activation 
for posthumanist research in education’, in N. Snaza and J. Weaver (Eds.) 
Posthumanism and Educational Research. London: Routledge, pp. 76-88.   
 
Stewart, K. (2007) Ordinary Affects. Durham: Duke University Press.  
 
Wallin, J. (2015) ‘Dark posthumanism, unthinking education, and ecology at the end 
of the anthropocene’, in N. Snaza and J. Weaver (Eds.) Posthumanism and 
Educational Research. London: Routledge, pp. 134-147.   
 
Wolfe, C. (2010) What is Posthumanism? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.   
